Socrates: 'I Know That I Know Nothing' — The Man Who Brought Philosophy Down to the Streets

Conclusion First (Key Takeaways)

• "Knowledge of Ignorance" — Overturning the Starting Point of Knowledge: Socrates claimed that the awareness of "knowing that one does not know" is the beginning of wisdom. This was not mere humility but an epistemological stance that regards unexamined conviction as the most dangerous form of ignorance.
• The Elenchus (ἔλεγχος) — Training Thought through Dialogue: Rather than teaching anything himself, Socrates examined his interlocutors' beliefs through questioning and exposed their contradictions. This method became the prototype of an education that trains not conclusions but "the capacity to think itself."
• Care of the Soul — The Internalization of Ethics: "What matters is not simply living, but living well." Socrates taught that not wealth or fame but the excellence (aretē / ἀρετή) of the soul (psychē / ψυχή) is what matters most for a human being. This claim was the first systematic challenge to a value system that prizes external success above all else.

Life and Historical Context

Socrates was born around 470 BCE in Athens. His father, Sophroniscus (Σωφρονίσκος), was a stonemason (or sculptor), and his mother, Phaenarete (Φαιναρέτη), was a midwife. His mother's profession later became a philosophical metaphor: Socrates called his own work "midwifery" (maieutikē / μαιευτική), saying that he "delivered" truths already present within the souls of others (Plato, Theaetetus 149a–151d).

Socrates lived during the golden age of Athens — and its collapse. Under Pericles (Περικλῆς), democracy reached its zenith; the Parthenon (Παρθενών) was built; the tragedians Sophocles (Σοφοκλῆς) and Euripides (Εὐριπίδης) and the historian Thucydides (Θουκυδίδης) were active. But in 431 BCE the Peloponnesian War (Πελοπόννησος) broke out, and Athens was dragged into twenty-seven years of attrition. In 430 BCE plague swept through the city, killing Pericles himself. In 404 BCE Athens surrendered to Sparta (Σπάρτη), and the terror of the "Thirty Tyrants" briefly held sway.

Socrates served as a hoplite in at least three military campaigns (Plato, Apology 28e). At the battle of Potidaea (Ποτείδαια, c. 432 BCE) he saved the life of Alcibiades (Ἀλκιβιάδης); at the battle of Delium (Δήλιον, 424 BCE) he was the last to retreat calmly amid a rout, his bravery attested by the general Laches (Λάχης), as Plato records (Symposium 220d–221c; Laches 181b). His bearing on the battlefield already delineates the profile of a philosopher whose "knowing" and "doing" were one. He also served at the battle of Amphipolis (Ἀμφίπολις, c. 422 BCE).

During the Potidaea campaign, another unforgettable episode occurred. One morning Socrates fell deep into thought and stood rooted to one spot. Noon came and he did not move. Evening came and he still did not move. Night fell, and still he stood. The soldiers, puzzled, carried their bedding outside to watch how long he would remain. When the sun rose the next morning, Socrates offered a prayer to the sun and finally walked away (Symposium 220c–d). For roughly twenty-four hours he had been sunk in meditation without stirring. This anecdote reveals that his philosophy was not a study-bound discipline but an endeavor of the entire self — body and soul.

Socrates's appearance was far from the Greek ideal of beauty. A snub nose, protruding eyes, thick lips — in Plato's Symposium, Alcibiades compares him to a figure of Silenus (Σειληνός, a type of Satyr). But, he continues, hidden within that ugly exterior was an astonishing beauty — an inner virtue (215a–b). This "reversal of exterior and interior" mirrors Socrates's own philosophy: the reversal of apparent knowledge and true knowledge.

He spent his life almost entirely without payment. In stark contrast to the Sophists (σοφισταί), who charged high fees to teach rhetoric, Socrates said, "I know nothing, so I cannot teach anything," and refused all compensation. As a result, his household was poor, and his wife Xanthippe's (Ξανθίππη) complaints have been proverbial since antiquity (Diogenes Laërtius, Lives of the Eminent Philosophers II.36–37).

The day of his execution in 399 BCE is immortalized in Plato's Phaedo (Φαίδων). From the morning, Socrates conversed with his disciples about the immortality of the soul. Toward evening he bathed, bade a final farewell to his wife and children, and received the poison cup (hemlock / kōneion / κώνειον) from the jailer with perfect composure. When his disciples burst into tears, he rebuked them: "What an absurd thing you are doing! That is exactly why I sent the women away. One should die in silence, not in an uproar" (Phaedo 117d–e). He drained the poison in one draught, walked about as instructed, then lay down. As his body grew cold, his last words were: "Crito, we owe a cock to Asclepius (Ἀσκληπιός). Pay it and do not forget" (118a). Asclepius was the god of medicine, and it was customary to offer a sacrifice upon recovering from illness. The meaning of this enigmatic testament — did he view death as a "cure for the disease called life," or was there some other significance? — has been debated for 2,400 years.

Mini Timeline

• c. 470 BCE: Born in the deme of Alopece (Ἀλωπεκή), Athens. Father: stonemason Sophroniscus; mother: midwife Phaenarete
• 440s BCE: Said to have studied natural philosophy under Archelaus (Ἀρχέλαος), a student of Anaxagoras (Ἀναξαγόρας)
• c. 432 BCE: Serves as hoplite at the battle of Potidaea
• 424 BCE: Serves at the battle of Delium. Wins renown for his calm retreat amid the rout
• 423 BCE: Satirized in Aristophanes's (Ἀριστοφάνης) Clouds (Νεφέλαι) as a natural philosopher and Sophist
• c. 422 BCE: Serves at the battle of Amphipolis
• 406 BCE: As a member of the Prytaneis (πρυτάνεις, presiding committee), alone opposes the illegal motion for a collective trial of the generals after the battle of Arginusae (Ἀργινοῦσαι) (Plato, Apology 32b)
• 404–403 BCE: Refuses the order of the Thirty Tyrants to arrest Leon (Λέων) of Salamis
• 399 BCE: Indicted by Meletus (Μέλητος), Anytus (Ἄνυτος), and Lycon (Λύκων). Found guilty and sentenced to death by the popular court. Dies by drinking the hemlock (aged c. 70)

What Did Socrates Ask?

The philosophers before Socrates — Thales (Θαλῆς), Anaximander (Ἀναξίμανδρος), Heraclitus (Ἡράκλειτος) — had inquired into nature (physis / φύσις). "What is the fundamental principle of all things?" "What is the law governing change?" The Sophists, Socrates's contemporaries, taught the art of rhetoric for winning in the law courts and the assembly, prizing "persuasion" over "truth." The relativism of Protagoras's (Πρωταγόρας) dictum "Man is the measure of all things" (Plato, Theaetetus 152a) was the representative position of that movement.

Socrates's inquiry pointed in a different direction from both natural philosophy and the Sophists. In Cicero's famous phrase, Socrates "called philosophy down from the sky to the earth" (Tusculan Disputations V.10–11). What he asked about was not the structure of the cosmos but how human beings should live. "What is courage?" "What is justice?" "What is the good?" "Can virtue be taught?" — these were questions that everyone assumed they already knew the answer to, yet could not answer when pressed.

Socrates's revolution lay in exposing this "illusion of knowledge." The politicians of Athens spoke of justice yet could not define it; the generals spoke of courage yet could not explain it; the poets sang of beauty yet did not know what it was. Socrates questioned them, shook their certainties, and demonstrated that believing one knows what one does not know is the most dangerous form of ignorance.

This stance naturally provoked resentment. His interlocutors were often publicly humiliated, and hostility toward Socrates accumulated. The trial of 399 BCE owed more to political grudges than to philosophical motives — in particular, the guilt-by-association resentment arising from the fact that one of Socrates's associates, Alcibiades (Ἀλκιβιάδης), had betrayed the democracy and defected to Sparta, and another, Critias (Κριτίας), had become the leader of the Thirty Tyrants.

Core Theories

1. "Knowledge of Ignorance" — The Paradox of Wisdom

When the Oracle at Delphi (Δελφοί) told Socrates's friend Chaerephon (Χαιρεφῶν) that "no one is wiser than Socrates," Socrates himself was perplexed: "I know nothing — so why am I said to be the wisest?" To test the oracle, he visited politicians, poets, and craftsmen who were reputed to be wise, and engaged them in conversation. He found that, while each possessed knowledge in their own domain, they believed they also knew the answers to fundamental questions — "the good life," "justice," "beauty" — when in fact they did not (Plato, Apology 21a–23b).

Socrates's conclusion was this: the sole respect in which he surpassed others in wisdom was that "he knew that he did not know." This is not mere intellectual humility. The conviction that one "knows" halts all further inquiry. The reason Athenian politicians never asked "What is justice?" was that they already believed they knew the answer. "Knowledge of ignorance" is the principled starting point for breaking through this intellectual stagnation.

This insight has lost none of its edge across the centuries. The more we are flooded with information and tempted by the illusion that "the right answer" is instantly available, the more urgent Socrates's warning becomes: not knowing what one does not know is the most dangerous state of all. The authority of experts, the opinion of the majority, the prevailing media narrative — every day we are exposed to the temptation of believing we "know" without having genuinely examined.

However, the extent to which Socrates's "ignorance" was sincere versus a rhetorical strategy (eironeia / εἰρωνεία) has been debated since antiquity. In Plato's dialogues, Socrates says "I know nothing" while often appearing to guide the discussion skillfully toward a particular conclusion. This problem, known as "Socratic irony," has been actively discussed among scholars since Gregory Vlastos's classic essay "Socratic Irony" (1987). It may be that rather than enlightening others from a position of "knowledge," Socrates understood that a dialogue can only spontaneously move the other's soul if he descends to the level of shared ignorance—an interpretation that sees irony as having a deeply educational (maieutic) intent.

2. The Elenchus (ἔλεγχος) — Inquiry into Truth through Dialogue

The elenchus — meaning "examination" or "refutation" — is the heart of Socrates's philosophical method. Its typical process runs as follows: (1) The interlocutor offers a confident definition of "What is X?" (e.g., "What is justice?"). (2) Socrates secures agreement to additional premises. (3) A contradiction is shown to arise between those premises and the original definition. (4) The interlocutor is compelled to retract the definition. (5) A new definition is proposed, and the elenchus is applied again — (Plato's early dialogues throughout).

Consider a concrete example. In the Euthyphro (Εὐθύφρων), the priest Euthyphro defines "piety" as "that which is loved by the gods." Socrates immediately asks: "Is the pious loved by the gods because it is pious, or is it pious because it is loved by the gods?" (10a). If the former, then "being loved by the gods" is not the definition of piety but merely a consequence. If the latter, the essence of piety reduces to the arbitrary preferences of the gods, and any independent standard of "piety itself" vanishes. Either way, Euthyphro's definition collapses. This "Euthyphro dilemma" remains debated in contemporary ethics as the prototype of the question concerning the relationship between religion and morality: "Does morality depend on God's commands, or does it stand independently of God?" (divine command theory vs. natural law theory).

Crucially, the elenchus often ends in aporia (ἀπορία — an impasse). In the Laches, definitions of courage are refuted one after another; in the Euthyphro, definitions of piety; in the Lysis, definitions of friendship — in each case, the dialogue concludes without a final answer to "What is X?" This is generally understood not as a failure of Socrates (or Plato) but as an intentional structure. Rather than having an answer "given" from the outside, the process of dismantling knowledge once taken as self-evident and actively asking "Is that really true?"—the very act of examination itself—is what trains the soul.

What is called the "Socratic method" in modern education derives from this structure. Rather than the teacher transmitting knowledge unilaterally, questions prompt the students to think for themselves. The case method at Harvard Law School is a classic example: the professor relentlessly questions students about a case and probes the contradictions in their reasoning.

The elenchus does have a methodological limitation sometimes called "Socrates's problem." Socrates tests the consistency of his interlocutor's beliefs, but a consistent belief system is not guaranteed to be true. A set of beliefs that is internally coherent yet globally false is logically possible, and the elenchus cannot fully overcome this problem. This critique has been pursued with precision in the analytical-philosophical Socrates studies of Vlastos, Benson, and others.

3. "Virtue Is Knowledge" — Ethical Intellectualism

Socrates's most daring ethical claim is the thesis "No one does wrong willingly" (οὐδεὶς ἑκὼν κακός) (Plato, Protagoras 345d–e; Meno 77b–78b). When people act badly, it is not because they desire evil but because they do not truly know what is good. With the right knowledge, a person will necessarily act rightly.

This position is called "ethical intellectualism." Its logic can be reconstructed as follows: all human beings desire what is good for themselves. Knowingly choosing an action that one knows to be harmful is irrational. Therefore, wrong action always stems from ignorance about the good.

To modern ears, this seems counter-intuitive. We can readily cite examples of people who smoke knowing it is harmful to their health, or who continue mass consumption knowing it damages the environment. Aristotle criticized his teacher's position, acknowledging the existence of "weakness of will" (akrasia / ἀκρασία) — the state of knowing the good yet succumbing to desire and choosing evil (Nicomachean Ethics, Book VII).

But a more charitable reading of Socrates's claim reveals a genuine insight. What does it really mean to "know" that smoking is harmful? Is intellectually acknowledging statistical data the same as "knowing" in one's very bones the consequences that will befall one's own body? The "knowledge" Socrates speaks of is not mere propositional knowledge ("knowing that P is true") but a practical wisdom — close to what East Asian thought calls "the unity of knowledge and action" — that actually transforms behavior. "If you truly know, your behavior changes" — this seemingly absurd claim is structurally akin to the insight of modern cognitive-behavioral therapy that changes in cognition lead to changes in behavior.

4. Care of the Soul (epimeleia tēs psychēs / ἐπιμέλεια τῆς ψυχῆς)

Socrates's fundamental claim is that "what matters most for a human being is the pursuit of the good condition of the soul (psychē / ψυχή)." In the Apology, he addresses the Athenian citizens: "Best of men, you are an Athenian, a citizen of the greatest city, and yet you care about acquiring as much money as possible, and about reputation and honor, but you do not care about or give thought to wisdom, truth, and the best possible state of your soul — are you not ashamed of this?" (29d–30a).

Here "soul" refers not so much to a spirit surviving after death (the Christian sense of "soul") as to the totality of a person's intelligence, character, and personality — the inner core of the self that thinks, judges, and acts. Wealth can be possessed by both the good and the wicked, but the excellence of the soul (aretē / ἀρετή) is achieved only through the individual's intellectual and moral effort. Hence: "The unexamined life is not worth living for a human being" (ὁ ἀνεξέταστος βίος οὐ βιωτὸς ἀνθρώπῳ; Apology 38a).

In contemporary terms, this is the claim that "it is the quality of one's inner character, not income, status, or fame, that determines human worth." Against the boundless pursuit of external approval, Socrates's question serves as a radical critical principle.

5. The Daimonion (δαιμόνιον) — The Inner Voice

From childhood, Socrates said that a certain "voice of the daimonion" (δαιμόνιον σημεῖον) — a divine sign — spoke to him. It always took the form of a prohibition, appearing only when he should not do something. It never positively commanded him to do anything (Apology 31c–d).

The interpretation of the daimonion has divided opinion since antiquity. Read religiously, it is a literal divine revelation. Read rationally, it is a pioneering conceptualization of moral intuition or conscience. Read psychologically, it is a system of highly trained intuitive judgment. In the vocabulary of modern psychology, one might understand the daimonion as a highly refined form of intuition — a "fast thinking" that reaches a conclusion before it can be articulated in language.

Philosophically, however, the most crucial point is that this inner voice never tells him what to do. It only issues prohibitions: "Do not do that." Any positive choice beyond that—"Then how should I live?"—is left entirely to the examination of his own reason. The divine sets the boundaries but does not provide the answers. In Socrates, absolute obedience to the divine and a rational inquiry based on absolute personal responsibility coexist without the slightest contradiction.

This became one of the grounds for the charge that Socrates "did not recognize the gods recognized by the state and introduced a novel daimonion." It was seen as a threat to the officially sanctioned religious order of the polis (πόλις).

Key Works Guide

Socrates himself left no writings whatsoever. His thought can only be reconstructed through the testimonies of his disciples. This generates what is known in the history of philosophy as the "Socratic Problem" — the Socrates of Plato, the Socrates of Xenophon (Ξενοφῶν), the Socrates of Aristophanes, and the Socrates referred to by Aristotle each present significantly different portraits. The following are the core texts for approaching Socrates's thought.

• Introductory: Plato, Apology of Socrates (Ἀπολογία Σωκράτους) — Socrates's defense speech at his trial. The whole of his thought — knowledge of ignorance, care of the soul, the examined life — is concentrated here. The finest text for an introduction to philosophy and the first work to read.
• Introductory: Plato, Crito (Κρίτων) — In prison, Crito urges Socrates to escape; Socrates refuses. The relationship between "the rule of law" and the principle of "doing no wrong" is vividly drawn in this concise dialogue. Best read immediately after the Apology.
• Intermediate: Plato, Meno (Μένων) — A dialogue on whether virtue can be taught. The "theory of recollection" is introduced, and the nature of knowledge, learning, and inquiry is probed. The most accessible example of the elenchus in action.
• Intermediate: Plato, Symposium (Συμπόσιον) — A series of speeches on Eros (love). The finale, in which Alcibiades paints a vivid portrait of Socrates as a person, is a tour de force.
• Advanced: Vlastos, G., Socrates: Ironist and Moral Philosopher, Cambridge UP, 1991 — The landmark work that defined analytical-philosophical Socrates scholarship in the late twentieth century. The structure of the elenchus and the interpretation of Socratic irony are analyzed with precision.

Major Criticisms and Debates

1. Aristophanes's Satire (Contemporary): The comic playwright Aristophanes caricatured Socrates in Clouds (Νεφέλαι, performed 423 BCE). In the play, Socrates lives in a "Thinkery" above the clouds, worships the clouds as gods, and teaches young men "to make the weaker argument defeat the stronger." This satire conflated traits of the natural philosophers and the Sophists in the figure of Socrates. Plato states in the Apology that this play shaped prejudice against Socrates over many years (18c–d, 19c). The gap between Socrates's real character and the comic caricature is a key facet of the "Socratic Problem."

2. Aristotle's Critique (Later): Aristotle directly challenged Socrates's "ethical intellectualism" — the thesis that virtue is knowledge and evil is always caused by ignorance. In Nicomachean Ethics Book VII, Aristotle acknowledged the existence of "weakness of will" (akrasia / ἀκρασία), arguing that it is possible to know the good yet be overcome by desire or emotion and choose evil (1145b21–27). Socrates's position, Aristotle judged, "manifestly contradicts the observed facts" (1145b27). This is one of the most important debates in the history of Western ethics, and remains unresolved 2,400 years later.

3. Nietzsche's Critique (Modern): In The Birth of Tragedy (Die Geburt der Tragödie), Nietzsche regarded Socrates as the root cause of the decline of Greek culture. According to Nietzsche, pre-Socratic Greek culture possessed a Dionysian (Διόνυσος) affirmation of life — a unity of suffering and joy expressed in tragedy. By making this the object of rational scrutiny, Socrates subordinated life to concepts and stripped Greek culture of its original vitality. "Theoretical man" Socrates was the prototype of "optimistic rationalism" — in Nietzsche's eyes, the starting point of cultural decadence.

4. The "Socratic Problem" (Modern): There is a fundamental methodological question of whether the real Socrates can be known at all. The principal evidence — Plato's dialogues — is simultaneously literature and philosophical work, and distinguishing where the faithful record of the historical Socrates ends and Plato's own thought begins is extremely difficult. Most modern scholars adopt the distinction that Plato's "early dialogues" (Apology, Crito, Euthyphro, Laches, etc.) are relatively close to the historical Socrates, while the "middle dialogues" (Phaedo, Republic, etc.) become dominated by Plato's own metaphysics (the Theory of Forms / ἰδέα). But even this distinction is contested.

Influence and Legacy

Antecedent Thought: The natural philosophy of the Milesian school (Thales, Anaximander, Anaximenes / Ἀναξιμένης), Heraclitus's concept of the Logos (λόγος), the Pythagorean (Πυθαγόρας) notion of purification of the soul, and Anaxagoras's (Ἀναξαγόρας) concept of Nous (νοῦς / mind). The Sophist movement (Protagoras, Gorgias / Γοργίας) was Socrates's direct adversary, yet also shared the premise of redirecting philosophy from nature to "human beings and society."

Direct Successors (Socratic Schools): After Socrates's death, his disciples diverged in astonishingly different directions over "what the master's teaching really was." Plato advanced to the Theory of Forms and the vision of the philosopher-king. Antisthenes (Ἀντισθένης) founded the ascetic Cynic school (Κυνικοί). Aristippus (Ἀρίστιππος) founded the Cyrenaic school (Κυρηναϊκοί), which identified pleasure as the good. Euclides (Εὐκλείδης) founded the Megarian school (Μεγαρικοί), which emphasized logic. That contradictory schools could spring from a single teacher is itself evidence that Socrates's thought was not a "system" but a "question."

Distant Successors: The Stoics developed Socrates's "virtue is knowledge" into the ethical foundations of Epictetus (Ἐπίκτητος) and Marcus Aurelius. The Skeptics took Socrates's "knowledge of ignorance" to its extreme, developing the philosophy of suspension of judgment (epochē / ἐποχή). In the modern period, Kierkegaard reinterpreted Socratic irony as the starting point of existentialism; Nietzsche (while criticizing him) situated Socrates at the turning point of Western civilization. The later Wittgenstein's "philosophical therapy" — the view that the work of philosophy is to untangle conceptual confusions — can be seen as a modern variation on the elenchus.

Impact beyond Philosophy: Socrates's trial and death remain the archetypal case for thinking about the tension between "freedom of conscience" and "the rule of law." The influence extends to the theory of civil disobedience in jurisprudence, the debate over the limits of democracy in political science, the Socratic method in education, and cognitive-behavioral therapy in psychotherapy — which dismantles clients' unexamined assumptions through questioning.

Connection to the Present

What Socrates left behind was not any particular doctrine. It was the attitude of "never ceasing to ask questions" itself. There has never been an age when this attitude was more needed than today.

In an age flooded with information, where "answers" seem available at the snap of a finger, we tend to mistake the sheer volume of information for "knowledge," to accept expert opinion without scrutiny, and to equate the majority view with "correctness." The more we lose the leisure to stop and think, the more Socrates's demand for the "examined life" gains weight — not as mere cultivation, but as practical wisdom.

Imagine a concrete scenario. In a political debate, someone declares that "such-and-such is obviously the case." The power to ask back, "What is the evidence for that? Are there hidden value judgments in the premises? Whose interests are reflected here?" is indispensable. In a medical setting, there is a fundamental difference between accepting a diagnosis at face value and pausing to ask "Are there other possibilities?" Socrates's elenchus remains effective as a technique of thought that refuses to take "answers" at face value.

A similar shift is occurring in education. In an age when the mere transmission of knowledge is no longer sufficient, the teacher's essential role is shifting toward teaching "the art of questioning." "Why is that answer correct? What if we change the premises? Can you give one counter-example?" — this is precisely the structure of the elenchus, and nothing other than what Socrates practiced 2,400 years ago.

For practical use, a minimal Socratic three-step check is enough: first, "What exactly is the definition of this claim?" second, "If this claim is true, what counter-example could still arise?" third, "If I adopt this claim, how would my actual behavior change?" Even this small triad can shift thought from mood-driven conformity to examined judgment. In this sense, Socratic philosophy can be inherited less as an abstract doctrine than as repeatable daily training in intellectual muscle.

At the same time, the limits of Socrates should be squarely faced. He optimistically believed that truth could be reached through dialogue, but real dialogue is shaped by power relations and emotions, and the "level playing field for dialogue" on which the elenchus depends does not arise automatically. Socrates's own habit of publicly refuting prominent Athenians walked a fine line with intellectual violence, as the outcome of the trial attests. "The power of questioning" functions productively only within a relationship of trust and equality with the person at whom it is directed.

Questions for the Reader

• Among the things you are convinced you "know," what are those for which you cannot actually provide evidence? If Socrates questioned you, which belief would be the first to collapse?
• Of the "common knowledge" and "received opinions" you encounter daily, how much have you actually examined for yourself? Where in your life does the boundary lie between "It's correct because everyone says so" and "It's correct because I've thought it through"?
• Socrates said, "Those who do evil are merely ignorant." Do you agree? If not, what does it mean to "do evil while knowing" — what kind of state is that?

References

• Primary Source (Core Testimonies): Plato, Apology, Crito, Euthyphro, Protagoras, Gorgias, Meno, Symposium, Phaedo. (Translations: G. M. A. Grube rev. J. M. Cooper in Plato: Complete Works, ed. J. M. Cooper, Hackett, 1997, is the standard English-language collection.)
• Primary Source (Alternative Perspective): Xenophon, Memorabilia (Ξενοφῶν, Ἀπομνημονεύματα) — Presents a more practical, commonsensical portrait of Socrates than Plato's. Essential for thinking about the "Socratic Problem" through comparison with Plato.
• Primary Source (Satire): Aristophanes, Clouds (Νεφέλαι) — A valuable testimony to how the contemporary Athenian public perceived Socrates.
• Primary Source (Philosophical Assessment): Aristotle, Metaphysics Books I & XIII; Nicomachean Ethics Book VII — Aristotle's philosophical evaluation of and criticism of Socrates.
• Secondary Source (Analytical Classic): Vlastos, G., Socrates: Ironist and Moral Philosopher, Cambridge UP, 1991 — The landmark work that defined analytical-philosophical Socrates scholarship. Contains precise analysis of the structure of the elenchus and the interpretation of Socratic irony.
• Secondary Source (Analytical Study): Brickhouse, T. C. & Smith, N. D., Plato's Socrates, Oxford UP, 1994 — An important counterpoint to Vlastos, reconstructing Socrates's philosophy via a different approach. Pays close attention to the religious dimension of Socrates.
• Secondary Source (Survey): Morrison, D. R., ed., The Cambridge Companion to Socrates, Cambridge UP, 2011 — Covers the latest research on every aspect of Socrates.
• Secondary Source (Trial and Politics): Stone, I. F., The Trial of Socrates, Little, Brown, 1988 — A journalist's reading of the political background to Socrates's trial. Rigorously interrogates Socrates's anti-democratic tendencies and challenges the "heroic martyr" image.
• Secondary Source (Nietzsche and Socrates): Nietzsche, F., The Birth of Tragedy (Die Geburt der Tragödie), 1872 — Sections 12–15 are the core of the critique. Argues how "theoretical man" Socrates destroyed the spirit of Greek tragedy.